University of Pennsylvania

Law Review
And American Law Register
FOUNDED 1852
Published Monthly. Except July. August and September, by the Universty of Penasyl.
vania Law School. at 236 Chestnut Street. Philadelphia. Pt.. and
34th and Chestnut Streets6 PhWelphia. Pa.
SUBSCRIPTION PRICE, $2.50 PER ANNUM; SINGLE COPIES, 35 CENTS
Board of Bditore:

EDWARD W. MADEIRA. Editor-In-bMef
B. M. SNOVER, Businesa Manager
Assoctote Edtors:

TIIOMAS REATH JL
JOSEPH N. EWING
GEORGE F. DOULAS
ROBERT M. GILKEY
EDWARD EISENSTEIN
JAMES F. HENNINGER
13ENJAMIN M. KLINE
EARLE HEPBURN
LOUIS E. LEVINTHAL
HARRY INGERSOLL
L BRADDOCK SCHOFIELD
GUY W . KNAUER
STEPHEN S. SZLAPKA
ALVIN L LEVI
PAUL C. WAGNER
LEWIS
W.
JOSEPH
RICHARD H. WOOLSEY

NOTES.
CARRIERS-STATE REGULATION OF RAILROAD RATLS--SEGREGATION-It is universally conceded today that a State' has the power to
regulate intrastate railroad rates, although the exact nature of the

power is not so well recognized. It is thought by some to be a
branch of the power of eminent domain,' on the theory that the ser-

vice is taken for the public use, and that the just compensation made

by the State is the allowance of a reasonable rate.

On the other

hand, it has been considered a branch of the police power, and indeed
the recent opinions of the Supreme Court of the United States would

2
seem to show that it is so considered by that body. Whatever the
nature of the power may be, it is not unlimited in extent, but is sub-

410.

• In Reagan v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co., 154 U. S. 362 (1893), at p.
Mr. Justice Brewer said that if a state took the actual railroad property

under its power of eminent domain it would have to pay compensation. He
then asks, "Is there less a' departure from the obligation of justice to seek
not the title but the use for public benefit . . . ?"
to take
5
German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Kansas, 233 U. S. 389 (1914).
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ject at least to the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution,' thus differing from the ordinary police power exercised by a
State for the health, morals and safety of its people.'
These two principles, then, are well established: first, that a
State may regulate rates of public service companies, and second.
that such regulation will not be constitutional if the rates fixed are
!.o low as to deprive the company of "a fair return on the value of
that which it employs for the public convenience". These principles, so simple to state, become extremely difficult to apply to the
complicated situations which arise when a rate or schedule of rates
established by a State are contested as confiscatory. What is a fair
return? How is the property devoted to the public use to be valued? Does the rule mean that a railroad is entitled to earn a return
on every act performed by it, or merely on its business as a whole?
Such questions as these cannot be settled by one or two decisions,
but the lines must be "pricked out by the gradual approach and
contact of decisions on the opposing sides".3 Thus it was settled in
Smi,,vth v. Ames that interstate and intrastate business could be segregated in determining confiscation. i. e., that the reasonableness of a
schedule of intrastate rates could be attacked without showing that
the whole of the carrier's business was carried on at a loss.
Two cases decided recently by the Supreme Court of the United
States are most important, not only as pricking the line a little further, but as expressing rather more definitely than usual the general
attitude of the court towards State regulation. In Norfolk & Westcrn Ry. Co. v. Conley' the railroad attempted to set aside the twocent passenger rate act of \Vest Virginia. The evidence showed that
the rate compelled the company to carry on its intrastate passenger business at or below cost. The State contended that if the company's entire intrastate business showed a fair return, it could not
object to the passenger rate in question. but the court held that "the
State may not select a commodity, or class of traffic, and instead of
fixing what may be deemed to be reasonable compensation for its
carriage, compel the carrier to transport it either at less than cost or
for a compensation that is merely nominal." In Northern Pacific
'SSmyth v. Ames, 119 U. S. 466 (1898).
'A State acting bona fide under its police power is not sublect to the
Fourteenth Amendment. Barbier v. Connolly. I13 U. S. 27 (1885); Powcll
It is only when the act of the state is so
v. Pa., 127 U'. S. 678 (888).
arbitrary that the court cannot consider it as a bona fide exercise of the

police power that the amendment does apply. Smith v. Texas, 2.33 U. S. 630
(1914).
' Noble State Bank v. Haskell. 219 U. S. 104, 112 (1911).
197, Oct. Term, 1914, decided Mar. 8. 1915. Opinion by Mr. Justice
No.
.
U. S.
Hughes,
I Nos. 4-'o & 421, Oct. Term, 1914, decided Mar. 8, 1915. Opinion by Mr.
U. S.
Justice Hughes,

NOTES

Ry. Co. v. North Dakuta objection was made to the State rates on
lignite coal, on the ground that they were confiscatory. The trial
court found that the rate was slightly remunerative, but in fact noncompensatory, but there was no evidence that the net intrastate earnings failed to yield a fair return. The court held, as it did in the
Norfolk & Western case that a State may not "segregate a "commodity or class of traffic and compel the carrier to transport it at a loss
or without substantial compensation".
These two cases are of primary importance as being flat decisions on the question of segregation, the one holding that intrastate
passenger rates may be segregated. the other that intrastate freight
rates on one commodity may be segregated. But in the latter decision, lest it should be misunderstood and its words extended too far,
the court is careful to say that "with respect to particular rates, it is
recognized that there is a wide field of legislative discretion, permitting variety and classification, and hence the mere details of what
appears to be a reasonable scheme of rates, or a tariff or schedule
affording substantial compensation. are not subject to judicial review". This decision must be considered in connection with the
facts of the case, and due emphasis must be laid upon the words
just quoted. The rates in question were rates established by a special act of the North Dakotas legislature, and applying only to shipments of coal. Had the coal rates been some of a number of other
rates adopted by the legislature at the same time, it is submitted that
under this decision unless the result of all such rates would be confiscation the court would not have interfered. The decision must be
confined to the case where the legislature or a commission has singled
out one rate or conmmodity and has acted with reference to that
alone.
The Supreme Court has never given a definite decision on what
is the "fair return" to which a carrier is entitled. But in these two
recent cases in three places the words "substantial compensation"
are used to indicate that which the carrier may demand. The phrase
is significant as showing to the railroads that if they can ever satisfactorily prove to the court the real value of the property devoted to
the public use, the return thereon to which they will be entitled will
at least not be illusory.
In the Northern Pacific case the avowed purpose of the legislature was to reduce the coal rates so as to create a market for its coal
and thereby give employment to local workers and develop local industry. It was urged that this was a declaration of public policy,
which alone would support the rate, but the court refused to accept
this argument and held that no public policy could require less than
reasonable rates. This is in effect an assertion by the court that if
the rate regulating power is a part of the police power, it may not be
exercised in an arbitrary fashion, and as such is quite consistent with
Laws r9o7, chap. ST.
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the previous decisions of the court on the limitations ol the exercise
of tle police power of a State.'
These cases are also interesting in that in the background of the
decisions runs the thought that the regulation of a carrier by the
State is founded upon the public profession or holding out by the
carrier and the regulation may not be extended beyond that to which
the carrier has by his public profession impliedly agreed to submit.
For example, in the Northern Pacific case, it is said, "The fact that
property is devoted to a public use on certain terms does not justify
the requirement that it shall be devoted to other public purposes, or
to the same use on other terms, or the imposition of restrictions not
reasonably concerned with the proper conduct of the business according to the undertaking which the carrier has expressly or impliedly
assumed." And in the Norfolk & Western case it was said, "The
devotion of the property of the carrier to public use is qualified by
the condition of the carriers' undertaking that its services are to be
performed for reasonable reward." The argument of the court thus
.ceems to be that the State can regulate property devoted to a public
use, but that the property of the carrier has been devoted to public
use on the condition that it receive not less than a reasonable return,
and that therefore the State in regulating is subject to the same condition, and may not regulate rates bo that they do not yield a reasonable return.
T. R., Jr.
CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW--INCRI

'IN.\NTION--TESTI.

olxy BEFORE

JtRY-Article Five of the Amendments to the Constitution
of the United States provides, among other things, that no person
..shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself". This provision was lately interpreted by the United States
District Court for the \Vesteni District of Pennsylvania in a very
interesting case.' The United States attorney instigated an investigation by the grand jury of an alleged fraud claimed to have been
perpetrated upon the government by the Carbon Steel Company in
furnishing certain steel for the construction of the Panama Canal.
Three of the men summoned before the grand jury by subpoena, and
not informed by the district attorney that they were the subjects of
inquiry in the investigation then proceeding were subsequently indicted. They immediately moved to quash the indictment, assigning
as their reason therefor that a conviction would be in violation of the
Fifth Amendment. The que tion presented to the court was whether
the fact that these defendants had been called as witnesses in the
preceding investigation rendered an indictment against them invalid. The defendants motion was overruled.
GRAND

'Norwood v. Baker, 172 U. S. 269 (x898); Smith v. Texas.
630 (1914).
'United States v. Wetmore rt aL, 218 Fed. Rep. 227 (1914).

233

U. S.

NOTES

We find in this case a balancing of two important considerations in the eves of the law, the first being that no person should be
convicted of a criminal offense upon his own testimony, and the second that the administration of pf'blic justice should be given broad
latitude and investigation into suspicious transactions be freely carried on. It has been settled that the preponderance of weight shall
be attributed to the latter. To hold otherwise would restrict the
grand jury to such a point that it would be compelled, before issuing
its process, to ascertain whether there might he any chance of disclosing the culpability of a witness. Should one be subpoenaed for
the purpose of acquiring information concerning the doings of
others, a.nd it be revealed during the inquiry that the witness himself
was involved, all chance to prosecute thi's guilty man would be at an
end.2 Thus, one of the most useful functions of the grand jury
would be greatly curtailed by this limitation upon its power to inquire into crimes generally.
The principal case turned upon the iact that the defendants had
not been compelled to testify, having made no objection nor claimed
immunity on the ground that their testimony might tend to incriminate them. Hlad they done so, they would doubtless have been able
to avoid testifying.3 The words "criminal case" have received different constructions in different courts, but the better view seems
to hold that the preliminary investigation before the grand jury is
part of such "case" to which the Fifth Amendment and similar provisions in State constitutions and statutes apply.' In accordance
therewith, the majority of courts have held that one cannot be compelled to testify before the grand jury even where a statute has been
passed to the effect that evidence obtained in such manner could not
be used against him or his property in any criminal proceeding in
any court of the United States.' The reason upon which such decisions are based is the fact that there was nothing to prevent the use
of the witness's testimony to search out other testimony which in
turn might be used against him after indictment.
If, however, the criminality is taken away absolutely, and a
statute is in force granting entire immunity from prosecution as to
matters sworn to by the witness, it has been held that he cannot re-

'See the court's citation of the district attorney's analysis of the results
which would follow from a contrary decision, in the very similar case of
United States v. Kimball. u17 Fed. Rep. i56 (9o2), at p. 162.
'State v. Noiwell, 38 N. H. 314 (1878); Counselman v. Hitchcock, 42
U. S. 547 (q9); Emerv's Case. 107 Mass. 172 0870; Cullen v. Commonwealth, 24 Gratt. 624 (Va. 1873): United States v. Kimball. supra; Boyd
v. United States. ix6 U. S. 616 (1886).
'Cf. People v. Kelly. 24 N. Y. 74 (1861), and Emery's Case, supra.
For a thorough discussion of these conflicting views, see Counselman v.
Hitchcock, supra.
* See cases cited in note 3, supra.
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fuse to testify in spite of the Fifth Amendment." This rule has been
carried one step further in requiring a witness to testify before the
federal grand jury, although the immunity extended to him by the
federal statute did not extend to prosecutions in a State court; and,
conversely, the fact that an immunity granted to a witness under a
State statute would not prevent a prosecution against him under a

federal statute was held not to render the State legislation unconstitutional."
J.N. .
EVIDENCE-ADMISSIBILITY

GIvEN AT A PREVIOUS

IN A CIVIL SUIT oF TESTIMONY

question as to the admissibility of testimony given at a criminal trial by a witness since
deceased, in a subsequent civil action, involving substantially the
same issue, between parties who had been prosecuting witness and
defendant in the former proceeding, has given rise to conflicting
opinions. Such evidence was admitted in two recent cases, the
courts proceeding, however, upon different theories.
In the case of Ray V. Henderson.' one of these recent decisions,
the following facts were involved. A civil action for damages for
assault and battery was brought by a person who had already prosecuted the defendant criminally for a felonious assault based upon
the same injury. The plaintiff sought to introduce testimony, given
at the preliminary hearing before a magistrate by a witne.ss who had
subsequently (lied. The court said: "'Wehave examined a number
of articles in different text-books on this question, and believe that
the rule relative to this class of evidence is fairly well stated . . .
thu-;: 'Facts may be established by evidence thereof given on a former trial provided the court is satisfied: (I) That the party against
whom the evidence is offered, or his privy, was a party on the former trial; (2) that the issue is substantially the same in the two
cases: (3) that the witness who proposes to testify to the former
evidence is able to state it with satisfactory correctness; and (4)
that a sufficient reason is shown why the original witness is not produced.' " The court concluded that the necessary elements of this
rule were satisfied by the facts of the case at bar with the possible
CRIMINAL TRIAr---The

exception of the requirement of identity of parties-a requisite
*Brown v. Walker, 161 U. S. 591 (1895). 'Mr. Justice Brown, speaking
for the Supreme Court, here said, "When examined, the cases will all be
found to be based upon the idea that if the testimony sought cannot possibly be used as a basis for, or in aid of, a criminal prosecution against
the witness, the rule ceases to apply, its object being to protect the witness
himself 'and no one elie and much less that it shall be made use of as a
pretext for securing immunity to others."
' Hale v. Henkel. 2,o U. S. 43 (iqo6), where Mr. Justice Brown further
,aid that "the only danger to be considered is one arising within the same
jurisdiction and under the same sovereignty".
'Jack v. Kansas, t90 U. S. 372 (19So).
S14.4 Pac. Rep. 1;5 (Okla. 1914).

NOTES
troublesome to other courts which, when confronted with
the same problem, sought to apply an "orthodox" rule, similarly
framed. In what appears to be the earliest case2 in which the subject was considered by an appellate court, evidence given at a criminal trial for the forgery of a promissory note was held to be inadnissible in a subsequent civil action brought against the maker by
the payee, who had been convicted of the forgery. The reason for
this conclusion was set forth as follows: "A criminal prosecution,
although instituted by an individual, is not in any sense an action between the persons instituting it and the prisoner. . . . The issue
is between the government and the prisoner on a question of the
guilt or innocence of the latter. It is not a question of property.
Very different is the issue, as also the parties in a civil suit to recover on the forged instrument. Then the defendant is clear of the
obligation, let the forgery be by whom it may, and the guilt or innocence of the plaintiff is not necessarily involved." Iowever, in another early case,3 in which the facts were identical with those in Ray
v. Henderson.4 similar evidence was admitted on the more logical
ground that "the parties were for this purpose, substantially the
same. The defendant was there in propria persona and the plaintiff,
the injured party, represented by his protector, the State".

In the case of North River Insurance Company v. lfPalker,6

another recent case, the question under discussion arose in the following manner. An action was brought on a fire insuran--tcy
bv the administratrix of the insured. The insurance company defended on the ground that the insured had set fire to the property,
and sought to introduce testimony, tending to prove this fact, which
had been given at a preliminary hearing of the latter upon a criminal charge of arson. The court admitted this evidence primarily
upon the authority of Professor \Vigmore's discussion of this subject. According to him, "There is no privity between the parties to
a criminal prosecution and a civil action for the same injury, yet
testimony given at the former ought to be admitted in the latter."
"The requirement of identity of parties is after all only an incident
or corollary of the requirement as to identity of issue. It then ought
to suffice to inquire whether the former testimony was given upon
such an issue that the party opponent had the same -interest and
motive in his cross-examination that the present opponent has."'
It seems obvious that Professor Vigmore's test, by which the
admissibility of evidence given at a former trial depends essentially
' Harger v. Thomas, 44 Pa.

x28 (1862).
* Gavan Y. Ellsworth. 45 Ga. 283 (1872). Accord: Charlesworth v. Tinker,
18 Wis. 633 (864); Krueger v. Sylvester, ioo Ia.647 0897); Ieatley v.

Long. 135

Ga.

153 (19io)..

'Supra, n. i.

a z7o S. IV. Rep. 983 (Ky. 19T4).

* Wigmore on Evidence, vol.
1Id., p. 1733.

2,

p. 1735.
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upon an adequate opportunity for cross-examination, is far more
logical and satisfactory than the arbitrary "orthodox" test which
has previously been set forth. The application of the latter is apparently the cau:.e of the conflict in the cases. some of which, as already noted, are strict in requiring a precise identity of parties,
while others strain to prove that there is an identity of parties between the prosecuting witness and the defendant of a criminal action, and the plaintiff and defendant of a civil action involving the
same issue. The case of Ray v.Ifenderson' recognized "a growing
tendency to make the test as to the admissibility of such evidence,
depend upon the right and opportunity to cross-examine. We think
this te t, most assuredly, should be applied, but not to the exclusion
or even to the diminution in value, of the other essentials, such as
reasonable identity of issues and parties". Such a view is not essentially different from Professor XVignore's. However, as late as
1911, the Supreme Court of Illinois.' though the latter's test was
pressed upon it, applied the reactionary doctrine that there must be
a precise identity otparties and issues. The Illinois court said: "If
the rule contended for were good law, then in an action by a passenger for a personal injury the testimony of a witness since deceased would be admissible against the same carrier for an injury
sustained in the same accident by another passenger, an employee, a
licensee, or a trespasser, simply because the carrier against whom
the testimony was offered had on a former trial an opportunity to
cross-examine the witness. This rule would carry us far afield and
we cannot sanction it." It seems, however, that an application of
Professor Wiginore's rule would not lead to any such conclusion.
The converse of the situation under di--cussion, namely,
whether testimony given in a civil suit should be admitted in a subsequent criminal action relating to the same, has ° been presepted in
a few cases. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma" refused to admit
testimony so given, although the same court, as has been already indicated.1 reached a contrary conclusion where the former trial was
criminal, and the latter, civil. The great weight of authority holds
that the constitutional right of confrontation is not violated by the
admission in a criminal trial of the former testimony of a deceased
* Supra, n. r.

"Mclnturff v. Ins. Co. of N. Amer., 248 1li 92 (1giz). The facts of
this case are identical with those in North River Ins. Co. v. Walker, supra,
n. s. with the single additional fact that in the former case the witness,
whose testimony. given at the former trial, was sought to be introduced inthe subsequent civil suit. had been murdered for so testifying by the defendant
LAw
in the criminal action. For a criticism of the Illinois case, see 6 ILL..
Rrv. 136.
In this case, the defendant
"Watkins v. U. S., 5 Okla. 729 (8).
offered in evidence the testimony given at the former civil action. In
L.uckie v. State. 33 Tex. Cr. 562 (1894). the state attempted to introduce
similar evidence. which was also excluded. Contra: Tichborne Case, charge
of Cockburn. C. J.. I1.p. 3o5: State v.N. 0. Waterworks,'1o7 La. i (19o1).
"Supra, a. 1.

NOTES

witness." The same considerations should apply whether the first
trial was criminal and the second, civil, or zice v.ersa, for apparently
there are no material differences between the two situations.
A.L.L.
FRAUD AND DrCEIT-FIDCIARY

RF...TIOXsnip-Derry v. Peek

CRITIcizE--A recent decision of the House of Lords is interesting

for its definite limitation and implied disapproval of the English
rule that requires proof of actual fraud, with knowledge of the
falsity of the representations, to support an action of deceit. This
rule is laid down in the leading case of Derry v. Peek' and is followed by many American jurisdictions.2
The case in question involves the peculiar relationship of solicitor and client, and it is this circumstance that induces the court
to distinguish the case and place it beyond the scope of the wrllestablished doctrine that generally prevails. Lord Ashburton, the
plaintiff, upon the advice of his solicitor, the defendant, had advanced a large sum of money to another of the latter's clients, with
a mortgage as security. The defendant later acquired a second
mortgage on part of the property and by his representations induced
the plaintiff to release that part. to his ultimate damage in a large
amount. There was gross negligence on the part of the solicitor
and his conduct was reprehensible to a degree, but there was no evidence of actual knowledge on his part that his statements were untrue nor no proof of an intent to cheat, so as to support a conviction
under the English rule. The trial court so found and dismissed the
action, after pointing out that, though it had been clearly established
that the defendant had advised the plaintiff badly and had fallen
short of his duty as a solicitor to his client, a case based on fraud
could not be turned into an action on the ca-'e for damages. The
Court of Appeals, however, reversed- the lower court's decision
on the ground that there was evidence enough of actual fraud, but
the House of Lords has taken the position that this can not be supported by the testimony, and that the plaintiff should be allowed to
recover notwithstanding, on the ground that the relationship was
one of a fiduciary character, to which the strict rule of Derry v.
Peek should not apply.3
It is instructive and interesting to trace the process of reasoning
by which the Lord Chancellor, Viscount Haldane, arrived at his
conclusion and justified his decision. He realizes that the position
Barnett i. People. 64 IlL 325 (87o); Owens v. State. 63 Miss. 450
(1886): U. S. v. Macomh. 5 McLean, 286 (8,). Contra: Cline v. State. 36

Tex. Cr. 320 (1896).
I Peek v. Derry, 14 App. Cases, 337 (Eng. 1889).
'Dilworth v. Bradner. 85 Pa. 238 (1877); Wimple v. Patterson, u17
S. W. Rep. io.34 (Texas, i9o"}; Krentz v. Kennedy. 147 X. Y. 124 (I,95).
'Xocton v. Lord Ashburton, ii Law Times. 641 (Eng. 1914).
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lie as-uei- at first blush might seem a startling one and takes pains
to pick his way carefully along what he seems to regard as well
known. though seldom trodden, paths of legal precedent. He first
points-out that Lord Ilerschell himself in his opinion in Derry v. Peek
recogni7ed the fact that the rule there laid down should not be applied to cases whcre there is some special duty to give correct infonration.' Ile declares also that this distinction has been overlooked bv subsequent authorities, which, in his words, "show a tendency to as-uwne that the case was intended to mean more than it
did"." lie then goes into the cases since 1889 in an effort to discover
-ome recognition of. this distinction and finds that the doctrine was
indorsed by Lord Justice Lindley in a later case," which, however,
was distinguished on different grounds, thereby giving to that part
of the opinion the weight of obiter dicta only. He next points out
that from the earliest times the Courts of Chancery and of the common law exercised a concurrent jurisdiction in cases of fraud in the
real sense, but that in addition the former always exercised an excluAve jur-diction in cases that involved some special duty or peculiar
relationship of trust or confidence. In this class of case, he declares
that the term *'fraud" was not used in the same sense as in the
courts of law. In such cases, equity would "prevent a man from acting against the dictates of conscience as defined by the court" and to
such cases the doctrine of Derrv v. Peek never was intended to apply. He characterizes this use of the word "fraud" as unfortunate
aud calls it a "nomen generalissimum". meaning in Chancery which
falls short of deceit, but imports a breach of some fiduciary duty to
which equity has attached its sanction. He thus arrives at the conclusion that nothing short of actual fraudulent intention in the strict
sense must be proved in an action of deceit, no matter whether a
court of law or a court of equity, in the exercise of its concurrent
jurisdiction, is dealing with the claim, but not so where "fraud" is
referred to in the wider sense used in Chancery to describe cases
within its exclusive jurisdiction. There the fault is that the defendant has violated, however innocently because of his ignorance,
an obligation which he must be taken by the court to have known,
and in that sense. his conduct has been "fraudulent".
'The words of the learned lord were as follows: "There is another class
of actions which I must refer to also for the purpose of putting it aside.
I mean those cases where a person within whose special province it lay
to know a particular fact. has given an erroneous answer to an inquiry made
with regard to it by a person desirous of ascertaining the fact for the purpose of determining his course accordingly, and has been held bound to
make good the assurances he has given."
Even before Lord Herschell's remarks, it had been pointed out by Lord
Selborne in BTrauntie v. Campbell. 5 App. Cas. 425 (Eng. i88o), that honest
lblief should be no defence in such cases. See also Burrowes v. Lock, to
Vesey. 470 (Eng. i8o51. where honest belief was no defence to a trustee who
liad made false statements as to the encumbrance upon the trust fund.
I Low v. Bonnerie, 6i L T. Rep. 533 (Eng. 1891).
'See Lord Justice James in Torrance v. Bolton, 27 L T. Rep. 738, L. Rep.

9 Ch. i18 (Eng. 1872).

-
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Lord IHaldane then turns his attention toward the facts of the
case in question and shows there exists the peculiar relationship
ie explains that the special duty may arise
which is necessary.
from the circumstances and may give rise to an implied contract at
law or a fiduciary obligation in equity, and finds that in the principal
case, the client would have had a right of action at law for breach of
the implied contract to be skillful and careful or in tort for negligence, as a remedy in equity because of the nature of the relationship.
Having thus found both an adequate
remedy and the necessary
prerequisites, Lord Haldane experiences no difficulty in arriving at
a conclusion. Notwithstanding the fact that the declaration expressly set forth fraud and that both the lower courts had held that
the action was one of deceit, he finds that it is really "an action
based on the old exclusive jurisdiction of a court of equity over a
defendant in a fiduciary position" and after some remarks as to the
effect of the Judicature Act. affirms the award of damages granted
by the Court of Appeals. The rest of the court realizes that this is
not strictly the proper remedy but agrees with it nevertheless,$ and the
Lord Chancellor himself admits that the proper form of granting
relief would be to order the defendant to restore to the mortgage
security what he had procured to be taken out of it.'
It is submitted that this case must be taken to be an acknowledgement on the part of the House of Lords that the English doctrine which requires proof of actual fraud in an action of deceit, is
too harsh a rule to be applied in all cases. Supported by innumerable decisions which have crowded the reports ever since the rule
was announced, the doctrine of Derrv v. Peek had become crystalized into a hard and fast principle by" the time this case arose, yet
here when the court was confronted with the problem as to whether
or not it should apply the rule to a case involving the special duties
of a fiduciary relationship, the very tribunal which is responsible
for the rule refused to carry it to the limits which all courts up to
this time had considered inevitable. Nor can the court be justly
criticized for its position. The case was clearly one that demanded
reparation for harm done and it iq not surprising that the court could
ilot bring itself to apply a principle which would have clearly defeated the ends of justice.
Rather should not the rule itself he open to attack? It proceeds
upon the principle that a nan should not be branded as a fraudSee the opinion of Lord Dunedin, who remarks. inter alia, as follows: -For the reasons given by the L.ord Chancellor, I think there was here
a remedy in equity for breach of duty. I agree that the form which that
remedy would have taken would not have been damages. but looking to the
course which the case has.taken, I do not think it incumbent on us to alter
the remedy to another which would practically come to much the same."
'This would have been possible in this case, for the defendant had a lien

on the same property.
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feasor, even though he has actually a fraudulent intent and the de,ire to cheat, if indeed, he does not actually know that the representations he make, are false and the inducements he holds out are
pitfalls. A premium is put upon the honest blunderer. No matter
how negligent a man may be in obtaining the information he gives,
no matter if every other reasonable man would have realized that
such information mu~t necessarily be false, if it cannot be proved
that there was actual knowledge of the falsity of the statements on
the part of the defendant, there can be no conviction in England for
deceit. Theoretically there may be grounds to support such a doctrine. Practically, however, it is inconceivable that it should be
applied religiously to every case and it is therefore gratifying to note
the refusal to do so in this recent -decision of the House of Lords.
In America the rule has never been uniformly adopted.10 Especially in the \Vest is there a tendency to repudiate the English
doctrine and to hold the defendant in actions for deceit to a strict
liability under all circumstances. It is also of interest to note that
Parliament itself was dissatisfied with the rule and shortly after it
was announced enacted legislation which made it effectual thereafter with respect to situations similar to the facts of Derry v.
Peek." This recent deci.-ion of the House of Lords puts a still
further limitation upon the rule. There is some doubt as to whether
it was ever intended to be so wide in its application," but however
that may be, it, scope in thik respect is now determined.

L.B.S.-

SALES-APRPRRA oxs-NWhere there is an executory contract
of sale, requiring the seller to appropriate certain goods to the contract, the seller cannot, even though the contract bind the buyer to
accept the seller's appropriation, appropriate to the contract goods
which are no longer in existence or have been destroyed. B contracted to buy from A, a dealer in oil seed. six thousand tons of soya
beans, and a clause in the contract recited that: "In case of resales,
a copy of original appropriation shall be accepted by buyers." The
shipper of a cargo of soya beans sold it to A while it was still afloat
and delivered to A a formal appropriation of the cargo. A intended
to re-appropriate the cargo to B's purchase by delivering to B a
copy of the "original appropriation", which B would be bound by his
Grant r. Husikle, 74 Wash. 257 (1913); Scholfield Pulley Co. v. Scholfheld. 71 Conn. 1 (zg98); Holcomb v. Noble, 69 Mich. 396 (888).
" Directors' Liability Act of i8go.
" See remarks of Lord Herschell, supra, note 4. See also criticism by
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contract to accept. But before .A could do this, he received word
that the ship had sunk and the cargo was lost. Nevertheless he tendered the "copy of original appropriation" to B, as provided by the
contract. B refused to accept it. knowing the cargo was at the bottomn of the sea. The dispute was referred to arbitrators, under a
clause in the contract, and they decided that B was bound to accept
the tender. From that award B appcaled to the Committee of Appeal of the Incorporated Oil Seed Association, and the committee
stated a special case for a King's Bench Divisional Court to decide
the point of law. It was held (Avory, Rowlatt and Shearman, JJ.),
reversing the award, that B was not so bound.' The- procedure in
the case is an illustration of a method by which merchants in London submit their disputes to extra-legal authorities for settlement,
in the course of which involved legal problems may be submitted by
those authorities to the High Court for elucidation. It is a very
common practice.
It is clear that a buyer may agree, in his contract, to be bound

by the seller's appropriation of goods, without further assent. But
if the goods perish before they are appropriated to the buyer's contract it is as though the seller had never hid them and his "appropriation" will be a mere empty form which cannot bind the buyer. It

is not one of the cases where impossibility of performance renders
the contract void, as provided for by Sections Six and Seven of
Sale of Goods Act ; they apply only where specific goods are
propriated to the contract by the terms of the contract itself,
where they are to be subsequently appropriated' thereto. If
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contract here, for instance, between A and B, had been for the sale
of beans in that particular cargo, the loss of the cargo would have
avoided the contract, under these sections of the act.
There is, it is true, an equitable rule that where a contract pur-

ports to assign goods to be acquired in futuro, as in this case,
"if the goods be sufficiently described to be identified on acquisition

by the seller, the equitable interest in them passes to the buyer as

soon as they are acquired."' 4 But as it is well understood that the
seller can, before actual appropriation, defeat this equitable interest
by a resale to a second purchaser who is without notice.3 so also that
equitable interest would be wiped out by the loss or destruction of
the goods before actual appropriation.
The decision involves no novel point of law but registers forially the opinion of a court on a point in the law of sale which,
though clear, does not seem to have been the basis for any reported
judgment
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